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Abstract / Résumé
The paper examines a micro data set of 417 commercial bankruptcies and
393 financial reorganizations field in Canada during the period 1977-87.
Descriptive statistics from the data are used to characterize the main features
of the bankruptcy process in Canada. Firms in bankruptcy or in reorganization
are typically small firms; the former being significantly smaller than the latter.
The data shows that firms in bankruptcy are in significantly worse financial
condition than firms in reorganization. Finally, the Canadian bankruptcy
process is efficient in offering a rapid solution to financial distress. However,
the data confirms the view that bankruptcy imposes substantial losses to
creditors.
Ce document poursuit deux objectifs. Premièrement, il présente les
caractéristiques financières des entreprises en faillite et en réorganisation sous la
Loi sur la faillite au Canada. Deuxièmement, il offre un aperçu du
fonctionnement du système de faillite canadien. Lanalyse de la situation
financière dun échantillon de 810 entreprises insolvables qui ont eu recours à
la loi au cours de la période 1977-1987 révèle que la très grande majorité de ces
entreprises sont de petite taille : 99 % des entreprises en faillite et 72 % des
entreprises en réorganisation ont une valeur au livre des actifs inférieure à un
million de dollars. Les créances ordinaires (fournisseurs de biens et services)
représentent le poste le plus important en proportion des créances totales des
entreprises. Suivent dans lordre les créances garanties (banques) et les créances
privilégiées (gouvernement, etc.). De façon générale, la situation financière des
entreprises en faillite est des plus critiques au moment de léchec alors que celle
des entreprises en réorganisation se veut relativement plus saine. Ceci se traduit
par des pertes importantes pour les créanciers lors de la faillite. En ce qui a trait
à son fonctionnement, le système de faillite canadien offre une solution rapide
aux entreprises en difficultés financières. En particulier, 84 % des propositions
de réorganisation sont soumis à lapprobation des créanciers en deça dun délai
de 60 jours.
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the topic of bankruptcy has been the object of a growing
concern. In Canada, the number of bankruptcies and nancial reorganizations
has risen signicantly since the beginning of the eighties. In addition, in Decem-
ber 1992, a new legislation governing the insolvency in Canada came into eect.
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Yet, as pointed out by Fisher & Martel (1994b), these legislative changes took
place without reference to detailed data on the characteristics of rms seeking
the protection of the Act.
Until recently, the vast majority of the empirical literature on rms in
bankruptcy and nancial reorganization was based on U.S. data. In Canada, this
phenomenon has been the object of few studies. First, Kryzanowsky & Holland
(1984) examined the characteristics of 76 rms which led for bankruptcy and
41 rms which led for nancial reorganization under the Canadian Bankruptcy
Act. Second, from a representative sample of 338 Canadian rms who have
led a reorganization proposal under the Bankruptcy Act, Fisher & Martel
(1994a,b,c) have provided new evidence on the characteristics of rms reor-
ganizing and on the reorganization process in Canada. The authors used the
data to examine the possible impact of the recent changes to the Act. However,
the analysis is still incomplete due to the lack of information on rms going
through straight bankruptcy.
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The object of this paper is to address this lack of data and to provide new
evidence on rms in bankruptcy and in nancial reorganization in Canada. We
analyze a representative sample of 417 rms which led for bankruptcy and 393
which led a reorganization proposal under the Bankruptcy Act for the period
1977-1987. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 oers an overview of
the legal environment surrounding commercial bankruptcy and reorganization
under the Bankruptcy Act in Canada and under the Bankruptcy Code in the
U.S. Section 3 describes how the data was collected and sections 4 and 5 oer
an detailed description of the characteristics of rms going through bankruptcy
and nancial reorganization respectively. The results are compared with other
Canadian and American studies. We conclude by discussing the implications of
these ndings from a policy perspective.
3
1
See Fisher & Martel (1994b) for a discussion of the amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.
2
Between 92-94% of commercial insolvency cases under the Bankruptcy Act are straight
bankruptcies. See Martel (1991).
3
The reader is referred to Martel (1991), Fisher & Martel (1994b) and Bohemier (1992) for
a discussion of the legal environment surrounding commercial bankruptcy and reorganization
in Canada.
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2 Overview of the Bankruptcy Process
2.1 Canada
The Canadian bankruptcy law oers two alternatives to insolvent debtors: bankruptcy
and reorganization.
4
A business bankruptcy is identied as being:
\a bankruptcy which is chiey attributable to liabilities incurred
as a result of the carrying on of a commercial venture or business and
includes proprietorships, partnerships and Limited Corporations."
A proposal is identied as being:
\a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act whereby the debtor,
with the approval of his creditors and the Court, is granted a com-
position of his debts, an extension of time to pay his debts or a
schema or arrangement to otherwise satisfy his creditors."
In the case of unincorporated businesses, the liabilities attributable to a business
venture have to represent more than 50% of the total liabilities in order to qualify
as a business estate.
5
2.1.1 Bankruptcy
In practice, ling for bankruptcy triggers the automatic stay provisions which
freeze all unsecured creditors' rights against the rm's assets.
6
The trustee,
selected by the petitioning creditors, takes possession of the debtor's assets,
sells them and distributes the proceeds among creditors following the allocation
schedule set out in section 136 of the Bankruptcy Act. Subject to the rights of se-
cured creditors, the order in which the proceeds are to be distributed among un-
secured creditors is summarized as follows: i) in the case of a deceased bankrupt,
funeral and testamentary expenses; ii) the costs of administration in the follow-
ing order, the expenses and the fees of the trustee, and the legal costs; iii) the
Superintendent levy, iv) wages, salaries, commissions and compensations, up to
a maximum of $500 per worker for services rendered three months prior to the
bankruptcy. Travelling salesmen are entitled to an additional $300 in expenses
7
;
v) municipal taxes or levied within the two years preceding the bankruptcy; vi)
4
The present discussion relates to the bankruptcy process prior to the amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act which came into eect in December 1992 (Bill C-22). Reference to any
signicant changes to the Act will be done in a footnote when necessary.
5
Annual Statistical Summary, Oce of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Industry and
Science Canada.
6
This section of the paper is based onMartel (1991). The reader is also referred to Bohemier
& Massue-Monat (1989) and Bohemier (1992) for more details on these aspects.
7
Any claims exceeding this limit rank as ordinary claims. The recent amendments to the
Act raised the upper limit on wage claims to $2000 for services rendered during the six months
preceding bankruptcy. Travelling salesmen are entitled to an additional $1000 in expenses.
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arrears of rent for a period of three months preceding the bankruptcy; vii) federal
deductions at source for Income tax, Unemployment insurance and employees
contributions to the Workers' Compensation Board; viii) claims of the federal
and provincial government not previously mentioned. All the above claims are
referred as preferred claims. Ordinary creditors are last, and their claims are set
on a pro rata basis.
8
Secured creditors, as a rule, are not subject to the stay
provisions; they can enforce their liens against the debtor's assets at any time
during the proceedings.
2.1.2 Reorganization
In Canada, rms in nancial distress have one means for commercial reorgani-
zation under the Bankruptcy Act: a proposal pursuant to Part III of the Act.
9
A proposal is a legal procedure which has the eect of staying proceedings by
unsecured creditors while enabling the rm to reorganize and continue operating
under the protection of the bankruptcy court. The rm attempts to arrive at
a settlement with its creditors by spreading out the repayment of their claims
over time, or reducing their claims, subject to the order of priority dened in
the Act. These repayments can be made in cash and/or in installments, and/or
in equity in the reorganized rm. In practice, a plan provides for the secured
claims to be paid in accordance with arrangements existing between the debtor
and the holders of the secured claims. Similarly, preferred claims have to be paid
in full before all claims of ordinary creditors. The latter are oered a partial or
sometimes a full payment of their original claims. In a proposal, the original
management team usually remains in control of the rm under the supervision
of a committee of inspectors which stays in place for the entire period covered
by the proposal.
To be accepted, a proposal requires the armative vote of unsecured cred-
itors representing 75 percent in value of the claims, and a majority in number
of the unsecured creditors.
10
Once accepted, a proposal has to be approved by
the court. Rejection of the proposal by unsecured creditors or the court entails
the automatic bankruptcy of the debtor. Secured creditors are not bound by
the 1949 Bankruptcy Act. They have the right to enforce their security, in the
event of a default, notwithstanding the ling of a proposal.
11
8
Ordinary creditors are typically trade creditors.
9
There also exists the Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act (C-36) which can be used
only by debtors which have outstanding secured or unsecured bonds (debentures) under a
trust deed. To our knowledge, there exists no formal records on its use by insolvent debtors.
See Bohemier (1992), Section II.
10
Bill C-22 provides for a softening of the voting requirement by lowering the value of claims
criterion to two-thirds instead of three-fourth.
11
Bill C-22 allows the debtor to include secured creditors in a reorganization plan which
automatically stay their proceedings. See Fisher & Martel (1994b) and Bohemier (1992),
Section III for a more detailed discussion.
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2.2 United States
In 1978, the American Congress adopted the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to replace
the Chandler Act. Commercial bankruptcies and reorganization are governed
by the so-called Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 respectively.
12
2.2.1 Bankruptcy (Chapter 7)
Similar to Canada, Chapter 7 provides for a liquidation procedure in the event of
bankruptcy by a debtor. A trustee is appointed to locate, evaluate and liquidate
the rm's assets in order to distribute the proceeds according to the absolute
priority rule dened in the Code. The order of priority is the following: i) ad-
ministrative costs of bankruptcy (including post-petition loans); ii) loans to the
rm made after the bankruptcy ling, if the ling is involuntary; iii) claims for
wages, salaries or commissions up to $2,000 per employee for services rendered
over the three months preceding bankruptcy; iv) claims for contributions to
employees' benet plans up to $2,000 per employee for services rendered over
the six months preceding bankruptcy; v) claims by customers for deposits up to
a limit of $900 per customer; vi) government claims for taxes of any type; vii)
claims of unsecured creditors; and viii) equity claims. Claims in the categories
ii) to vi) are referred to \priority" claims.
Under the Code, secured creditors are given the highest priority over the
proceeds from the sales of their specic lien assets. Secured creditors are allowed
to take possession of the lien assets directly only if the value of their claims
exceeds the value of the assets. Otherwise, the assets are liquidated by the
trustee on their behalf.
2.2.2 Reorganization (Chapter 11)
Under the Code, the ling of a proposal imposes an automatic stay of proceed-
ings on all creditors, including secured creditors. However, any creditor can seek
a court order in order to be relieved of the stay. In reorganization, the original
management can remain in control of the rm or a trustee can be appointed to
oversee management. The rm's management has an exclusivity period of 180
days to propose their own plan. The plan can apply to all creditors, including
secured creditors. Creditors can then propose an alternative plan after this pe-
riod is exhausted. The rm's management or the trustee is allowed to dispose
of any of the rm's assets, shut down parts of the rm's operations or sell the
rm as a going concern.
According to the Unanimous Consent Procedure (UCP), secured and unse-
cured creditors can only vote on a proposal if their claims have been cut back.
Otherwise, they are deemed to have accepted the plan. Secured creditors are
considered individually rather than as a class. Priority claims can also be cut
12
This section is based on White (1984).
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back, but if so, they must vote in favour of the plan. The repayment of tax
claims can be spread over a period of up to six years. A plan is deemed to be
approved if a majority of creditors in each sub class, representing two-thirds of
the claims of those creditors voting in that sub class, are in favour of it. Equity
who's claims have been impaired can also vote on a proposal. To approve the
plan, they must vote in favour of it by two-thirds of those shares voting. The
elimination of all equity automatically results in the rejection of the plan by
equity holders and the plan cannot be approved under UCP. A class of creditors
who receives nothing under the plan is deemed to have rejected it.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides for a second reorganization procedure,
called cramdown. This procedure can be used if an impaired class of creditors
rejects a reorganization proposal. In such a case, the court can approve the
plan as long as each dissenting class of creditors is treated according to the \fair
and equitable" standard. Basically, this standard requires that creditors cannot
receive a lower treatment than what they would receive in liquidation. Due to
high transactions cost, cramdown is scarcely used.
3 Data
In Canada, each bankruptcy and reorganization proposal under the Bankruptcy
Act is led with one of 15 regional bankruptcy oces of Industry & Science
Canada. The les used for this study originate from two regional oces: Mon-
treal and Toronto for the period 1977-1987. From a list of 27,324 commercial
bankruptcies and 1,280 commercial reorganization, a random sample of 1000
rms is selected.
13
This sample is composed of two sub-samples; i) 500 com-
mercial bankruptcies and ii) 500 commercial reorganization proposals.
The data reported in this study is taken directly from the rms' individual
les. Due to the fact that some les were not available or to the absence of key
information, the nal sample is reduced to 810, which includes 417 commercial
bankruptcies and 393 commercial reorganization proposals. The Montreal re-
gional oce is the source of 274 bankruptcy les and 273 reorganization les
while the other 143 bankruptcy and 120 reorganization les come from the
Toronto regional oce.
Since little is known about rms going through bankruptcy and nancial
reorganization, we compare our results with other Canadian and American
studies. In Canada, our results are compared with those of i) Kryzanowsky
& Holland (1984) who examine a sample of 76 rms which led for bankruptcy
in 1976 and 41 businesses which led a reorganization proposal over the period
1972-1980
14
and ii) Fisher & Martel (1994c) who study a sample of 338 rms
13
Random sampling was carried out using the Systematic Random Sampling Procedure.
The sample is chosen to be representative of the regional distribution of bankruptcies and
reorganization over the years and the regional oces.
14
The reorganization sample consists of 32 incorporated businesses and 9 unincorporated
6
in nancial reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act for the period 1978-1987.
15
In the U.S., we use dierent sources of comparison. First, White (1984)
reports on the characteristics of 90 insolvent rms which led for Chapter 7 and
95 rms which led for Chapter 11 under the Old Act as well as 73 rms which
led for Chapter 7 and 45 rms which led for Chapter 11 under the New Code
in the Southern District of New York. Second, White (1983) examine some of
the characteristics of 90 rms liquidating and 96 rms reorganizing under the
Old Act and of 88 rms liquidating and 33 rms reorganizing under the New
Code in the same bankruptcy district.
16
Finally, Flynn (1989) examines 2,395
rms from all over the U.S. reorganizing under Chapter 11 between 1979 and
1989.
4 Commercial Bankruptcies
4.1 Financial Variables
As Table 1 indicates, Canadian rms ling for bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy
Act are typically small rms. For the full sample, the average value of assets is
$74,231 ($5,202) while the average value of liabilities is $232,565 ($87,882).
17
As
expected, the estate size is signicantly larger for incorporated than for unincor-
porated rms: the mean value of assets is $177,251 and $31,335 for both types
of businesses respectively.
18
Similarly, the mean value of liabilities is $476,293
and $131,758 for incorporated and unincorporated businesses respectively.
19
Based on their sample of 76 bankrupt rms, Kryzanowsky & Holland nd
a mean value of assets and liabilities of $85,756 and $140,185 respectively. For
the White (1984) sample, the mean value of assets and liabilities of rms which
led for Chapter 7 under the Old Act is U.S.$736,000 and U.S.$1.551 million
while the mean value of assets and liabilities of rms which led for Chapter
7 under the New Code is U.S.$437,000 and U.S.$710,000.
20
This suggests that
U.S. rms ling for Chapter 7 are signicantly larger than Canadian rms ling
for court protection under the Bankruptcy Act.
Firms in bankruptcy are generally very small. Nearly 85% of all bankrupt
rms have a value of assets lower than $100,000 and 98% of the estates have
businesses.
15
A comparison with the study of Fisher & Martel is done only when there is a marked
dierence in the results.
16
The Old Act applies to the period prior to 1980 while the New Code covers the period
after 1980.
17
Dollar values are reported in June 1993 Canadian dollars, deated by the GDP deator.
Median values are reported in parenthesis for the full sample of rms.
18
Of the 407 rms in the sample, 288 (70.7%) are incorporated and 119 (29.3%) are unin-
corporated businesses. None of the rms in the sample have publicly traded shares.
19
We use the term "signicant" in comparing incorporated and unincorporated rms when
the mean value of the two sub-samples are statistically dierent at a 5% level.
20
Values for American rms are current U.S. dollars.
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assets lower than $500,000. None of the rms in the sample had a value of
assets greater than $10 million; the largest estate is evaluated at $8.2 million.
Although the distribution of estates by liabilities is less pronounced, the data
indicate that 55% of rms have liabilities lower than $100,000 and that 92% of
rms have liabilities lower than $500,000. The largest estate has $9.4 million in
liabilities.
These results are in line with those found by Kryzanowsky & Holland. Based
on their sample, 50% of the bankrupt rms have a value of assets lower than
$10,000. Our data shows that 68% of the rms in our sample have a value of
assets lower than $23,600.
21
In the area of insolvency, the liabilities to assets ratio is often used as an
indicator of the rm's nancial health. As Table 1 indicates, the nancial health
of Canadian rms in bankruptcy is critical; the liabilities to assets ratio is
equal to 72.2 (8.1) for the entire sample of rms. Incorporated rms, with
a liabilities to assets ratio of 10.6, are, on average, in signicantly much better
nancial condition than unincorporated rms which have a mean ratio of 96.3.
22
This result contrast with those found by White (1984). The mean value of the
liabilities to assets ratio for bankrupt rms under the Old Act and the New Code
is 2.1 and 1.6 respectively. White (1983) reports a ratio of 2.26 and 1.62 for
rms liquidating under the Act and the Code respectively. This suggests that
American rms le for bankruptcy at a much earlier stage of nancial distress
than Canadian rms.
4.2 Secured Claims
About 48% of all commercial bankruptcies involve some secured claims. The
mean value of secured claims is $72,761 ($0) for the full sample of rms. Incor-
porated rms, with an mean value of $159,837, have signicantly larger secured
claims than unincorporated rms which with a mean value of $36,752. Secured
claims represent approximately 19% of total liabilities. This proportion does
not vary signicantly across the two classes of rms. The same trend appears
when we examine the number of secured creditors in bankrupt rms. For the
full sample, there is, on average, 1 secured creditor involved in the proceedings.
In absolute terms, there is no dierence between incorporated and unincorpo-
rated rms. This suggests that larger rms in bankruptcy do not rely more on
secured nancing than smaller rms.
Based on the White (1984) sample, the mean value of secured claims for
American rms liquidating under Chapter 7 of the Old Act and the New Code
is U.S.$548,000 and U.S.$182,000 respectively. White (1983) estimates that the
21
The $10,000 gure used by Kryzanowsky & Holland corresponds to about $23,600 in June
1993 dollars.
22
Using the assets to liabilities ratio, rms in the sample have a mean ratio of 0.204. This
result is consistent with those of Kryzanowsky & Holland who nd an average assets to
liabilities ratio of 0.21.
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ratio of secured claims to total liabilities is equal to 34% for the rms liquidating
under the Act and 55% for those liquidating under the Code. This suggests that
banks play a larger role in the nancing of U.S rms in liquidation under Chapter
7 than for Canadian rms in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act.
As pointed out by Fisher & Martel (1994a,b), secured creditors play an
important role in the Canadian insolvency process. They typically represent an
important source of capital and can prolong the life of a business by extending
new loans. A major determinant of the rm's ability to attract new loans is the
presence of free assets in the rm. The data reveals that the ratio of secured
claims to total assets is equal to 1.39 (0) for all the rms, with incorporated
rms having a lower ratio of assets that are secured, 1.30 than unincorporated
rms, 1.42.
23
White (1984) nds that the mean ratio of secured claims to total assets of
the rms under the Act and the Code is equal to 0.75 and 0.42 respectively.
White (1983) estimates this ratio at 0.77 for rms under the Act and at 0.89
for rms under the Code.
4.3 Ordinary claims
Every bankruptcy estates involves some ordinary claims. For the full sample, the
average value of ordinary claims is $130,117 ($50,134). Incorporated rms have
a signicantly larger value of ordinary claims, $254,691, than unincorporated
rms with an average value of $78,601. The proportion of ordinary claims in
total liabilities is equal to 68.2% for all bankrupt rms, 66.7% for incorporated
businesses and 68.9% for unincorporated businesses.
For the White (1984) sample, the mean value of ordinary claims is equal to
U.S.$1.05 million and U.S.$481,000 for bankrupt rms under the Old Act and
the New Code respectively.
24
Typically, a commercial bankruptcy estate involves an average of 20 ordinary
creditors; this number being signicantly higher for incorporated than for un-
incorporated rms. Incorporated rms have almost three times more ordinary
creditors than those of unincorporated rms; the former having an average of 38
ordinary creditors compared to 13 for the latter. Ordinary creditors represent
by far the largest class or creditors in a bankruptcy estate. For the full sample,
they represent 80.8% of all the creditors. There is not a signicant dierence
between incorporated rms and unincorporated rms.
23
It is reasonable to assume that the maximum value for the secured liabilities to assets
ratio should be 1. The data shows that this ratio exceeds the value of 1 in 21% of the
estates. Imposing a constraint on the maximum value for the secured liabilities to assets ratio
signicantly reduces its value. For the full sample, the ratio is then equal to 0.40; it is equal
to 0.45 and 0.37 for incorporated and unincorporated businesses respectively. This suggests
that the unconstrained ratio is biased by the presence of some estates with an exceptionally
large secured liabilities to assets ratio.
24
The U.S Bankruptcy law uses the term unsecured instead of ordinary.
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An interesting feature of our data set is that it provides information on the
distribution of claims among creditors of a same class. The data shows that, on
average, the largest ordinary creditor holds 49% of the total ordinary claims.
In fact, a single creditor holds more than 25% of the ordinary claims in 82% of
the estates examined. When calculated over the total value of unsecured claims
(ordinary and preferred), a single ordinary creditor holds a potential veto right
in more than 70% of the estates. This is an important fact when considering that
these creditors would have a veto right if the rm had opted for reorganization
rather than for bankruptcy.
4.4 Preferred claims
About 78% of all commercial bankruptcy lings involve some preferred claims.
For the full sample, the average value of preferred claims is equal to $26,138
($3,862). Incorporated rms have almost four times as much preferred claims
than unincorporated rms ($53,812 for the former compared to $14,022 for the
latter). Preferred claims represent 12.3% of the rms' liabilities at the time of
bankruptcy. This proportion is slightly higher for incorporated rms, 14.0%,
than for unincorporated rms, 11.5%.
According to White (1984), preferred claims are relatively small in Chapter 7
cases.
25
The mean value of priority claims under the Old Act and the New Code
is equal to U.S.$65,000 and U.S.$46,000 respectively. These represent less than
5% of total liabilities at the time of bankruptcy.
There are only a few preferred creditors involved in a bankruptcy estate. For
the full sample of rms, the average number of preferred creditors is equal to 3
(2); this number is signicantly higher for incorporated than for unincorporated
businesses (6 vs. 2 creditors).
4.5 Crown claims
About 66% of all bankruptcy estates involve some Crown claims. On average,
Crown claims represent more than 55% of preferred claims and about 10% of
total liabilities. For the full sample of rms, the average value of Crown claims
is equal to $20,575 ($1,830). These claims are higher for incorporated rms,
$39,494, than for unincorporated rms, $12,752.
An important component of Crown claims are the claims for source deductions.
26
According to the data, claims for source deductions represent, on average, 40.5%
(8.4%) of Crown claims in a bankruptcy estate. Incorporated and unincorpo-
rated rms have the same proportion of source deductions in Crown claims.
The average value of claims for source deductions is $8,900 ($352) for the full
25
The U.S. Bankruptcy law uses the term priority instead of preferred.
26
These are levies for Income Tax, Unemployment Insurance and Canada Pension Plan
contributions.
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sample and it is equal to $8,628 and $9,012 for incorporated and unincorporated
businesses respectively.
4.6 Wage claims
Only 41 les of the full sample have positive wage claims. Incorporated rms
account for 26 of these les while unincorporated rms account for 15 les.
For the 41 estates, the average value of wage claims is $7,377 ($1,264). Wage
claims are signicantly higher for incorporated than for unincorporated rms,
with an average value of $10,526 for the former compared to $1,919 for the
latter. Approximately 96% of total wage claims rank as preferred claims and
4% rank as ordinary claims. The same distribution holds for incorporated and
unincorporated rms. On average, there are 12 (3) wage creditors involved in a
bankruptcy estate. Incorporated businesses, with 18 creditors, have signicantly
more wage creditors than unincorporated businesses which have 3 creditors.
On an individual basis, the average wage claim per worker is equal to $597
($611) for the full sample of rms. Incorporated and unincorporated have a
similarwage claim structure with an average claim of $606 and $583 respectively.
The wage claim per worker exceeds the value $500 in 46% of the estates and
the value of $800 in 15% of the estates which suggests that maximum amounts
allowed by the Act to rank as preferred claim is often binding on wage creditors.
However, the amounts involved are relatively low.
4.7 Payo Rate to Creditors
As Table 3 indicates, bankruptcy imposes substantial losses on ordinary and
preferred creditors. For the full sample, the payo on ordinary and preferred
claims is equal to 2.5% (0%) and 23.2% (0%) respectively.
27
Ordinary creditors
receive a zero payment in 77% of the bankruptcies while preferred creditors
receive nothing in 53% of the bankruptcies. The payo to creditors does not
vary signicantly between incorporated and unincorporated rms.
These results compare with those found by Kryzanowsky & Holland and by
White (1984). The former nd a payo rate of 1.4% and 24.4% to ordinary and
preferred creditors respectively. Ordinary and preferred creditors respectively
receive a zero payo rate in 80% and 51% of the bankruptcy estates. For the
sample of rms under the Old Act, White (1984) nds that the average payo
rate to unsecured and priority creditors is equal to 4% and 6% respectively.
Unsecured and priority creditors receive a zero payo rate in 71% and 50% of
the cases examined. White (1983) estimates a 2% payo rate on unsecured
claims.
27
The payo rate to creditors is calculated from the value of \led and approved" claims.
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4.8 Bankruptcy Process
Tables 4 also displays some descriptive statistics on the Canadian bankruptcy
process. The average time spent by rms in bankruptcy is 818 (690) days.
28
Paradoxically, incorporated rms spend less time in bankruptcy than unincor-
porated rms (770 days compared to 838 days.)
For the full sample, administration costs amount to $5,892 ($2,193). These
costs are signicantly larger for incorporated, $12,690 than for unincorporated
rms, $3,059. On average, administration costs represent approximately 44% of
the value of assets
29
and 5% of the value of liabilities.
30
Compared to unincor-
porated businesses, incorporated businesses have a signicantly lower ratio of
administration costs to assets but a signicantly higher ratio of administration
costs to liabilities.
Trustees' fees represent an important component of administrative costs in
bankruptcy. On average, trustees' fees account for 80% of total administration
costs. Typically, unincorporated businesses have a signicantly lower ratio of
trustees' fees to administration costs. This could be explained by the fact that
smaller estates have a larger portion of the xed-cost component of administra-
tive costs.
Kryzanowsky & Holland nd similar results. Based on their sample of
bankrupt rms, the average time spent in bankruptcy is 870 days. However,
these results contrast with those found in the U.S.. According to White (1984),
rms in liquidation under the Old Act spent an average of 2,190 days (6 years)
in bankruptcy. This is almost three times more than the time spent by Cana-
dian rms in bankruptcy. White (1984) estimates that, administration costs
amounts to 1% of total liabilities. White (1983) estimates this percentage at
1.3%. This is consistent with the presence of a scale eect in administration
costs and that U.S. rms have lower average xed costs of administration.
Many studies [Warner (1977), Ang, Chua & McConnell (1982), Gilson, Kose
& Lang (1990) and Fisher & Martel (1994c)] found evidence for the presence of
a scale eect in administration costs in nancial reorganization. To investigate
the presence of a similar scale eect in bankruptcy, we estimate the following
equation:
31
Administration costs = 2580.9 + 0.054 Assets { 0.083 Assets
2
(6.05) (15.17) (14.18)
28
The time spent in bankruptcy is the time between the ling date and the trustee's dis-
charge date.
29
We use the value of assets as reported in the debtor's statement of aairs.
30
Kryzanowsky & Holland (1984) estimate that the ratio of estimated realizable value to
book value of the assets ranges from 42.5 to 52.5%. Using a value of 50%, we estimate that
the ratio of administration costs to assets is equal to 55.6%.
31
Variables are measured in 1993 dollars. There are 406 observations, R
2
= 0:364 and the
absolute values of the t-statistics are given in parentheses.
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The regression result indicates the presence of a scale eect in the bankruptcy
process and administration costs increase with the real value of assets but at a
decreasing rate.
5 Financial Reorganizations
5.1 Financial Variables
As indicated by Table 9, rms in nancial reorganization in Canada are rela-
tively small rms. For the full sample of rms, the average value of assets is
about $2.45 million ($350,874) and the average value of liabilities is equal to
$2.98 million ($783,890). Estates of incorporated businesses, are signicantly
larger than those of unincorporated businesses.
32
The average value of assets
and liabilities of incorporated businesses is equal to $2.84 and $3.34 million
while the average value of assets and liabilities of unincorporated businesses is
$171,410 and $719,734 Firms in nancial reorganization have, on average, a li-
abilities to assets ratio of 16.0 (1.8). Contrary to Fisher & Martel (1994b), we
nd no marked dierence in the liabilities to assets ratio between incorporated
and unincorporated rms. According to the data, about 72% of rms in the
sample have a value of assets lower than $1 million while 57% of rms have
total liabilities lower than $1 million.
Kryzanowsky & Holland (1984) nd a mean value of assets of $247,592 for
Canadian rms in reorganization. In the U.S., White (1984) nds a mean value
of assets and liabilities equal to U.S.$1.59 million and U.S.$1.84million for rms
reorganizing under the Old Act and U.S.$1.64 million and U.S.$2.23 million for
rms reorganizing under the New Code. According to Flynn's data (1989),
reorganizing rms in the U.S. average US$5.0 million in liabilities and US$4.8
million in assets. Among the full sample of 2,395 cases, 42.4% of the estates
have assets lower than U.S. $1 million while 37.6% of the estates have total
liabilities lower than U.S.$1 million.
According to White (1983), the liabilities to assets ratio is 1.09 for the sam-
ple of rms reorganizing under the Old Act and 1.32 for the sample of rms
reorganizing under the New Code. Based on Flynn's sample (1989) the liabili-
ties to assets ratio of rms ling for Chapter 11 is 1.30. This suggests that, on
average, American rms undergoing reorganization are in considerably better
nancial health than Canadian rms.
32
Of the 393 rms in the sample, 336 (85.5%) are incorporated and 57 (14.5%) are unin-
corporated businesses. Only 10 rms have publicly traded shares.
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5.2 Secured claims
About 82% of all commercial proposals involved some secured claims. The mean
value of secured claims is $1.61 million ($201,254) for the full sample of rms.
Incorporated rms, with a mean value of $1.87 million, have signicantly larger
secured claims than unincorporated rms with a mean value of $105,384. For
the full sample, secured claims represent approximately 32% (30.8%) of total
liabilities; incorporated businesses relying more on secured nancing, 33.3%,
than unincorporated businesses, 24.4%.
The same trend appears when we examine the number of secured creditors.
For the full sample, there is, on average, 3.4 (2) secured creditors involved
in the proceedings, with secured creditors being signicantly more present in
incorporated than in unincorporated businesses. This suggests that larger rms
in reorganization rely more on secured nancing than smaller rms.
To evaluate the rm's ability in attracting new loans, we examine the ra-
tio of secured claims to total assets. The data reveals that, on average, 78%
(54%) of the rms' assets are secured at the time of reorganization, with incor-
porated rms having a lower proportion of assets that are secured, 65% than
unincorporated rms, 157%.
33
In White's sample (1984), the mean value of secured liabilities is U.S.$
480,000 and U.S.$1.1 million for incorporated rms in reorganization under the
Act and the Code respectively. White (1983) estimates that secured claims ac-
count for about 18% of total liabilities of rms reorganizing under the Act and
for about 36% for those reorganizing under the Code. The study also reports
a mean ratio of secured claims to assets 0.20 for the former and of 0.48 for the
latter. White (1984) reports a ratio of 0.30 and 0.70 in the cases of proposals
under the Act and the Code respectively. It appears that U.S. rms are, on
average, in a in a better position to reorganize than Canadian rms owing to
the presence of more free assets.
5.3 Ordinary claims
Every nancial reorganization involves some ordinary claims. For the full sam-
ple, the average value of ordinary claims is $1.01 million ($438,754). Incorpo-
rated rms have a signicantly larger value of unsecured claims, $1.1 million
than unincorporated rms with an average value of $379,078. Ordinary claims
represent the largest portion of total liabilities in a reorganization. The propor-
tion of ordinary claims in total liabilities is equal to 59.5% (58.2%) for all rms in
reorganization, 58.0% for incorporated businesses and 68.4% for unincorporated
businesses.
33
If we impose the constraint that the proportion of assets that are secured cannot exceed
1, the ratio is then equal to 51% for the full sample and it is equal to 53% and 42% for
incorporated and unincorporated businesses respectively.
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Overall, Canadian corporations appear to have a lower level of ordinary
claims than American corporations. According to White (1984), the mean value
of ordinary liabilities of U.S. rms in reorganization is U.S.$1.1 million.
Typically, a nancial reorganization involves an average of 110 (68) ordinary
creditors. Reorganization of incorporated rms have signicantly more ordinary
creditors than those of unincorporated rms; the former having an average of 125
ordinary creditors compared to 24 for the latter. Ordinary creditors represent
by far the largest class or creditors in a bankruptcy estate. For the full sample,
they represent 84.4% (89.0%) of all the creditors. There is not a signicant
dierence between incorporated rms, 84.5%, and unincorporated rms, 83.7%.
The data shows that, on average, the largest ordinary creditor holds 30.5% of
total ordinary claims. In fact, a single creditor holds more than 25% of ordinary
claims in almost 50% of the reorganization cases. When calculated over the
total value of unsecured claims (ordinary and preferred), one ordinary creditor
holds a veto right in more than 43% of the estates. This means that there is
one creditor who is pivotal in almost half of the reorganization proposals.
5.4 Preferred claims
About 84% of all reorganization involve some preferred claims. For the full
sample, the average value of preferred claims is equal to $111,459 ($23,744).
Incorporated rms have signicantly more preferred claims, almost seventeen
times, than unincorporated rms ($129,036 for the former compared to $7,832
for the latter). Preferred claims represent 6.1% (3.5%) of the rms' liabilities at
the time of reorganization. This proportion is signicantly higher for incorpo-
rated rms, 6.5%, than for unincorporated rms, 3.7%. There are, on average,
20 (3) preferred creditors involved in a nancial reorganization of a Canadian
business. Compared to incorporated businesses, unincorporated rms have typ-
ically only a few preferred creditors (signicant at a 5% level).
According to White (1984), the mean value of priority (i.e. preferred) claims
for incorporated businesses in reorganization is U.S.$40,000 and U.S.$68,000 for
rms reorganizing under the Act and the Code.
5.5 Crown claims
About 80% of all reorganizations involve some Crown claims. On average,
Crown claims represent more than 59% (69.4%) of preferred claims and about
4.5% (2.1%) of total liabilities. For the full sample of rms, the average value
of Crown claims is equal to $76,137 ($15,094). These claims are signicantly
higher for incorporated rms, $88,012, than for unincorporated rms, $6,142.
In proportion of preferred claims, the former have twice as much Crown claims
than the latter; 63.1% compared to 36.4% (signicant at a 5% level).
Compared to Fisher & Martel (1994c), we nd a lower proportion of Crown
claims in preferred claims. These authors nd that Crown claims represent 80%
15
of preferred claims in the large corporate sample
34
, 70% in the small corporate
sample and 80% in the non-corporate sample.
Claims for source deductions represent, on average, 41.8% (32.4%) of Crown
claims in a proposal. Incorporated businesses have a signicantly higher pro-
portion of source deductions in Crown claims than unincorporated businesses
(43.8% for the former compared to 30.5% for the latter.) The average value
of claims for source deductions is $31,508 ($4,762) for the full sample and it
is equal to $36,472 and $3,368 for incorporated and unincorporated businesses
respectively (signicant at a 5% level).
5.6 Wage claims
Only 125 les (32%) of the full sample have positive wage claims. Incorporated
rms account for 121 of these les while unincorporated rms account for only 4
les.
35
For these 125 les, the average value of wage claims is $54,527 ($17,053).
Approximately 90% of total wage claims rank as preferred claims and 10% rank
as ordinary claims. On average, there are 55 (23) wage creditors involved in a
reorganization.
On an individual basis, the average wage claims per worker is equal to $1,396
($750) for the full sample of rms. The wage claim per worker exceeds $500
in about 75% of the estates and $800 in about 32% of the estates. This sug-
gests that maximum amounts allowed by the Act to rank as preferred claim is
insucient in many reorganization proposals.
5.7 Payo Rate to Unsecured Creditors
As Table 11 indicates, creditors are oered, on average, 38.2 (30.0) cents for
every dollar of claims in a reorganization proposal. Proposals from incorpo-
rated rms oer a slightly higher payo rate, 38.8 cents than proposals from
unincorporated rms, 34.8 cents.
36
Kryzanowski & Holland (1984) nd a comparable payo rate to ordinary
creditors in reorganization. Their study shows that the ordinary creditors re-
ceive, on average, 36.9 cents for every dollar of claims against an insolvent debtor
in reorganization. Fisher & Martel (1994c) report slightly higher gures with an
average payo rate of 43.6 cents on the dollar. The White (1984) study reports
payo rates of 33 cents on the dollar under Act and 34 cents on the dollar under
the Code.
34
Large corporations have liabilities over $5 million; small corporations have liabilities under
$5 million.
35
No comparison is done between incorporated and unincorporated business given the small
number of unincorporated cases with positive wage claims.
36
From the sample of 356 proposals with available informationon the payo rate to ordinary
creditors, 44 proposals (12.4%) provided for a full repayment and 5 proposals (1.4%) provided
for a null repayment.
16
A reorganization proposals can provide for three types of payments to cred-
itors; cash, installment and equity payments.
37
For the full sample, 5% of the
proposals oered cash payment only, 85% of the proposals oered installment
payments only and 8% of the proposals oered both cash & installment pay-
ments. As Table 11 indicates, the great majority of payments, 91%, are made
by installments while cash payments represent, on average, 7% of the proposed
payments to creditors. Equity payments occurred in only four reorganization
proposals.
According to the data, unincorporated rms use cash payments twice as
often as incorporated rms (9.3% compared to 4.2%). Similarly, a combina-
tion of cash and installment payments is used in 14.8% of the proposals led
by unincorporated businesses and 6.9% of the proposals led by incorporated
businesses. Installment payments only are observed in 75.9% and 86.8% of the
proposals led unincorporated and incorporated rms respectively.
The use of cash payments is less frequent in Canada than in the U.S. White
(1983) estimates from a sample of 26 accepted proposals under the New Code
that cash represents 38% of the payment to creditors. From another sample of
26 rms with conrmed reorganization proposals under the Code, White (1984)
estimates that cash represents 47% of the payment to creditors. Lastly, from
a sample of 24 completed reorganization plans Franks and Torous (1991) nd
that cash represents 29% of the payment to creditors.
The lower part of Table 11 displays additional statistics on the payments to
creditors. According to the data, 50% of the total payments are paid within
three months of court's approval and almost 80% of total payments are paid
within one year of court's approval. There are no signicant dierences be-
tween the method of payments of incorporated and unincorporated businesses.
Typically, the deferred payments to creditors are made in 3 (2) installments and
the repayment is spread over a mean period of 14 (9) months.
Kryzanowski & Holland (1984) estimate that the payments to creditors are
made in seven installments over an average period of 24 months. Fisher &
Martel (1994c) nd that, on average, the payments to creditors are spread over
22 months. In addition, they estimate that the proportion of cash payments is
twice as high as the one found by this study.
5.8 Reorganization Process
Table 12 displays some descriptive statistics on the reorganization process in
Canada. For the full sample of rms, the average time between the ling of the
proposal and the creditors' vote is equal to 50 (25) days. Typically proposals
led by incorporated rms take the same time period to be submitted to the
creditors' vote than proposals led by unincorporated rms. Overall, 60% of
the proposals are voted within 30 days of the ling date, 84% are voted within
37
Cash paymentsare dened as paymentswithin 1 month of court's approval of the proposal.
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60 days and 90% are voted within 90 days.
These gures are notably dierent from U.S. data. Based on Flynn (1989),
the average time from ling to conrmation of a proposal in the U.S. is 740 days
and the average period ranges from 531 to 996 days. According to the same
study, only 18% of cases take less than one year to be conrmed and almost
40% take longer than two years. White (1984) reports an average time from
ling to conrmation of 24 months for rms reorganizing under the Act and
17 months for rms reorganizing under the Code. Two factors could explain
the considerable dierence between the U.S. and Canada. First, in the U.S.,
reorganization is potentially more complex than in Canada. For example, under
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, creditors can also propose reorganization plans.
38
There also exists a cramdown procedure in the U.S., which often involves a
valuation of the rm's assets by outside appraisers, testimony by experts, etc., all
of which may prolong the reorganization process. Second, compared to Canada,
courts are typically more involved in the reorganization process in the U.S.
On average, rms spent about 1,136 (965) days in reorganization.
39
Incor-
porated businesses spend almost the same time in reorganization than unincor-
porated businesses. For the U.S., Ang, Chua and McConnell (1982) nd that
it takes about 14 months (approximately 420 days), on average, to complete a
reorganization plan. Franks and Torous (1989) nd an average period in reor-
ganization of 3.7 years. On balance, our data suggests that the reorganization
period in Canada is shorter than the U.S.
A holding proposal is an interim document led by an insolvent debtor re-
quiring more time for the preparation of a nal proposal. There are 93 holding
proposals (23.7%) in the sample of rms in reorganization. This proportion
is signicantly higher for incorporated rms, 27.1%, than for unincorporated
rms, 3.5%.
Finally, about 37% of the proposals in the full sample are amended at least
once by unsecured creditors. This is higher than the percentage reported by
Kryzanowsky & Holland (1984) who estimate that approximately 27% of the 41
proposals examined are amended.
5.9 Administration Costs
Table 12 indicates that for the full sample, administration costs amount to
$46,312 ($20,046). These costs are signicantly larger for incorporated, $52,558
than for unincorporated rms, $14,863. On average, administration costs rep-
resent approximately 13% (5.5%) of the payments to creditors and 4.8% (2.9%)
of the value of liabilities. Both ratios are lower for incorporated rms than
for unincorporated rms. Trustees' fees represent an important component of
38
Strictly speaking, creditors can propose plans only after a 180-day period during which
only the debtor may propose a plan.
39
The time in reorganization is the number of days from the ling date of the proposal to
the discharge date of the trustee.
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administrative costs in reorganization. On average, trustees' fees account for
69.4% (72.9%) of total administration costs; the ratio being slightly lower for
incorporated businesses, 68.5%, than for unincorporated businesses, 73.3% (sig-
nicant at a 5% level). These results compare with those of Kryzanowski &
Holland who estimate a ratio of trustees' fees to total administration costs of
68.2%.
For the U.S., Warner (1977) reports a ratio of bankruptcy costs to the value
of the rm's debt and equity of 5.5%, and Altman (1984) nds a ratio of 6.2%.
White (1984) estimates a ratio of administration costs to payment to creditors of
3.0% and 3.4% for rms reorganizing under the Act and the Code respectively.
Administration costs represent about 0.5% of total liabilities.
To investigate the presence of a scale eect in administration costs in reor-
ganization, we estimate the following equation:
40
Administration costs = 22930 + 0.136 Assets { 0.436 Assets
2
(5.58) (7.91) (7.80)
The regression result conrms the presence of a scale eect in the reorga-
nization process and administration costs increase with the real value of assets
but at a decreasing rate.
5.10 Proposal acceptance rate
For the full sample, approximately 75% of the proposals are accepted by un-
secured creditors. Contrary to Fisher & Martel (1994c), we nd that unin-
corporated businesses, 88%, have a signicantly higher acceptance rate than
incorporated businesses, 73%.
Kryzanowski & Holland (1984) nd slightly lower acceptance rate of reor-
ganization proposals, with a rate of 68.3%. The acceptance rate in Canada is
substantially higher than in the U.S. According to Flynn (1989), the overall con-
rmation rate for Chapter 11 cases led prior to 1987 is 10{12%. The nding of a
signicantly higher acceptance rate in Canada is surprising. It is commonly be-
lieved that the U.S. bankruptcy system aims at the rehabilitation of the debtor,
whereas the Canadian bankruptcy system is more oriented towards the recovery
of creditors' money. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code has a voting requirement that
is more lenient than the Canadian Bankruptcy Act.
41
In addition, the cram-
40
Variables are measured in 1993 dollars. There are 344 observations, R
2
= 0:155 and the
absolute values of the t-statistics are given in parentheses.
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In order for a reorganization plan to be adopted, Canadian law requires that a majority of
unsecured creditors representing at least 75 percent of the value of claims of creditors voting
cast votes in favour of the proposal. In the U.S., the proportion of the value of claims of
creditors that must vote in favour of the proposal in order for the plan to be adopted is 66
2
3
percent.
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down procedure in the U.S. allows, under certain circumstances, for a plan to
be adopted despite the objection of some classes of creditors. Nothing like the
cramdown procedure exists under the Canadian bankruptcy law. Thus, because
it appears to be easier for rms to reorganize in the U.S., it seems reasonable to
expect higher rates of acceptance in the U.S., ceteris paribus. This conjecture
is not, however, supported by the data.
5.11 Voting procedure
In Canada, prior to December 1992, a proposal was deemed to be accepted by
unsecured creditors provided that i) a majority of unsecured creditors at the
meeting voted in favour of the plan, and ii) the claims of unsecured creditors
voting represented at least three-quarters of the total claims of those creditors
voting.
To examine this issue, we collected information on the vote of unsecured
creditors to accept or reject a proposal. On average, there are about 31 (19)
unsecured creditors voting on a proposal. This represents a participation rate
of 34% (32.5%) from unsecured creditors. On average, a proposal receives the
approval of about 84% (91%) of unsecured creditors present at the assembly,
who represent 80% (94%) of the total claims of those unsecured creditors.
Kryzanowsky & Holland (1984) estimate a higher participation rate from
unsecured creditors, with an average rate of 44%. They also nd that, on
average, the proposals submitted by rms in their sample received the approval
of about 81% of unsecured creditors present at the assembly, who represented
91% of the total claims of those unsecured creditors.
5.12 Proposal success rate
An accepted proposal is dened as a success if a debtor meets all the terms of
the proposal before the trustee can be discharged. The data indicates that more
than 70% of the accepted proposals are successful. Proposals of unincorporated
rms, 76%, are slightly more successful than those of incorporated rms, 69%.
Given the acceptance rate of 75%, we nd that the overall success rate for rms
entering reorganization is about 53% for the full sample of rms.
The success rate of the rms in our sample is lower than the one reported
Fisher & Martel (1994c), 81%, but higher than the success rate estimated by
Kryzanowski & Holland (1984), 53%.
6 Conclusion
This paper has described a micro data set of 417 rms which led for bankruptcy
and 393 rms which led for nancial reorganization under the CanadianBankruptcy
Act for the period 1977-1987. To our knowledge, this data set on bankrupt
20
rms is unique to both Canada and the United States in that it contains micro
information from a large-scale random sample. The data set on nancial reor-
ganization is the second large-scale sample in Canada with the one of Fisher &
Martel (1994c).
Generally speaking, rms in bankruptcy and in nancial reorganization in
Canada are relatively small. Compared to rms in reorganization, rms in
bankruptcy are signicantly smaller, by a scale factor of more than 30. The
former are also in much better nancial health than the latter. These facts
raise a serious concern with respect to the main objective of the reform to the
Bankruptcy Act.
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which aims to promote the reorganization of rms in nancial
distress. Given the nancial situation of rms in bankruptcy, we believe that
bankruptcy was the right decision for the vast majority of these rms. In this
context, encouraging the reorganization of some of these rms may be inecient
and costly for the Canadian economy.
The data conrms the view that bankruptcy imposes substantial losses to
creditors, in particular ordinary creditors who receive only 2.5 cents for every
dollar of claims. In a sense, the same conclusion holds for nancial reorganiza-
tion where ordinary creditors receive an average payo of 38 cents on the dollar.
However, trustees and legal experts appear to be the biggest beneciaries of
bankruptcy. The total administration costs represent a proportion of 44% of
the value of assets at the time of bankruptcy. This ratio is evaluated at 56%
if we use a ratio of estimated realizable value to book value of assets equal to
50%. On average, trustees fees represent 80% of total administration costs.
These cost elements are less important in reorganization where administration
costs represent 13% of the total payment to creditors.
The data shows that the Canadian bankruptcy system is ecient in oering
a rapid solution to nancial distress. On average, a bankruptcy estate is closed
within 2.25 years and a reorganization proposal is completed within 3.1 years.
In reorganization, the future of a rm is typically decided within about 50 days
from its ling of a proposal. The changes to the stay of proceedings introduced
by the amendments to the Bankruptcy Act provide reorganizing rms with a
minimum of 51 days to submit a proposal to creditors vote. But according to
our data, 80% of all proposals are voted within 51 days of ling. Therefore, we
doubt that these changes will have a signicant impact on the reorganization
procedure.
Finally, it is our view that the reorganization process in Canada works rel-
atively well since 75% of the proposals are accepted by creditors and that 70%
of these proposals succeed. Therefore, the ex ante probability that an insol-
vent rm entering reorganization will succeed in its attempt is about 52.5%. Of
course, one would hope that the success be close to 100% which would indicate
that creditors are always taking the right decision. However, it is dicult to
evaluate whether a failure rate of 30% is high or low given the absence of an
42
See Fisher & Martel (1994b).
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alternative basis for comparison.
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TABLE 1
Financial Characteristics of Firms in Bankruptcy in Canada.
1
Variables Mean Median Standard Min Max
deviation
Total assets
2;3
74.231 5.202 438.953 0.00 8 229.00
Total liabilities 232.565 87.882 673.606 4.41 9 377.20
Secured claims 72.761 0.000 338.146 0.00 5 883.70
Ordinary claims 130.117 50.134 311.881 0.00 3 256.66
Preferred claims 26.138 3.862 141.491 0.00 2 620.74
Crown claims 20.575 1.830 132.777 0.00 2 620.74
Source Deductions claims
4
8.900 0.352 29.618 0.00 376.89
Total wage claims
5
7.377 1.264 15.961 0.07 79.40
Preferred wage claims 6.644 1.182 14.060 0.07 79.40
Ordinary wage claims 0.733 0.000 4.142 0.00 26.48
Total wage claim per worker 0.597 0.611 0.351 0.07 1.59
Contingent claims 3.545 0.000 49.177 0.00 971.26
Liabilities to assets ratio 72.242 8.086 260.150 0.80 3 042.00
Secured claims / total assets 1.387 0.000 5.783 0.00 77.67
Secured claims / total claims 0.189 0.000 0.267 0.00 0.96
Ordinary claims / total claims 0.682 0.765 0.297 0.00 1.00
Preferred claims / total claims 0.123 0.041 0.196 0.00 1.00
Crown claims / total claims 0.102 0.020 0.187 0.00 1.00
Crown claims / preferred claims 0.553 0.724 0.452 0.00 1.00
Source deductions / crown claims 0.405 0.084 0.450 0.00 1.00
Number of secured creditors 0.961 0.000 1.395 0.00 8.00
Number of ordinary creditors 20.432 12.000 38.819 0.00 634.00
Number of preferred creditors 2.983 2.000 11.368 0.00 213.00
Number of contingent creditors 0.055 0.000 0.391 0.00 5.00
Number of wage creditors 12.171 3.000 30.671 1.00 190.00
Total number of creditors 24.432 15.000 45.448 1.00 701.00
Secured creditors / total creditors 0.056 0.000 0.093 0.00 0.57
Ordinary creditors / total creditors 0.808 0.853 0.176 0.00 1.00
Preferred creditors / total creditors 0.132 0.094 0.152 0.00 1.00
Notes:
1. Except where noted, the information reported in this table is based on a sample of 417 les.
2. The total assets, total liabilities, and the claims variables are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadian dollars,
deated by the gdp deator (series D20556).
3. Based on a sample of 415 les where the information is available.
4. Based on a sample of 395 les where the information is available.
5. Based on a sample of 41 estates with positive wage claims.
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TABLE 2
Distribution of Bankruptcy Estates by Assets and Liabilities.
Variables Distribution of Estates by
Assets Liabilities
 $100 000 352 228
$100 000 <  $500 000 56 157
$500 000 <  $1 000 000 4 19
$1 000 000 <  $5 000 000 2 11
$5 000 000 <  $10 000 000 1 2
> $10 000 000 0 0
Total 415 417
TABLE 3
Payments to Creditors in Bankruptcy in Canada.
Variable
1
Mean Median Standard Min Max
deviation
Payo rate to ordinary creditors
2
2.533 0.000 9.534 0.00 100.00
Payo rate to preferred creditors
3
23.182 0.000 37.198 0.00 100.00
Notes:
1. The information on the payo to ordinary and preferred creditors originate from the trustee'sFinal Statement of Receipts
and Disbursements. The variables are reported in percentages.
2. Based on a sample of 406 les where the information is available.
3. Based on a sample of 333 proposals where the information is available.
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TABLE 4
Characteristics of the Bankruptcy Process in Canada.
Variables Mean Median Standard Min Max
deviation
Time in bankruptcy (days)
1
818.300 690.000 458.680 195.00 3 052.00
Total administration costs
2;3
5.892 2.193 12.558 0.00 118.28
Trustees fees
4
3.949 1.877 7.886 0.00 85.18
Ratio of trustees fees to admin. costs 0.799 0.860 0.214 0.00 1.00
Admin. costs / total assets
5
0.443 0.285 0.411 0.00 1.00
Admin. costs / total liabilities
6
0.049 0.033 0.049 0.00 0.35
Notes:
1. Based on a sample of 414 les where the information is available.
2. Based on a sample of 408 les where the information is available.
3. Administration costs and trustees fees are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadian dollars, deated by the gdp
deator (series D20556).
4. Based on a sample of 407 les where the information is available.
5. Based on a sample of 406 les where the information is available.
6. Based on a sample of 408 les where the information is available.
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TABLE 5
Financial Characteristics of Incorporated and Unincorporated Businesses in Bankruptcy.
1
Variables Incorporated Businesses Unincorporated Businesses
Mean Median Mean Median
Total assets
;2
214.541 19.878 31.335 2.382
Total liabilities

476.293 138.184 131.758 65.575
Secured claims

159.837 10.856 36.752 0.000
Ordinary claims

254.691 88.845 78.601 42.330
Preferred claims 53.812 10.797 14.022 2.372
Crown claims 39.494 5.342 12.752 1.034
Source Deductions claims 8.628 1.678 9.012 0.000
Total wage claims
;3
10.526 4.653 1.919 0.699
Preferred wage claims 9.403 3.561 1.861 0.695
Ordinary wage claims 1.122 0.000 0.058 0.000
Total wage claim per worker 0.606 0.620 0.583 0.541
Contingent claims 7.961 0.000 1.718 0.000
Liabilities to assets ratio
;4
10.566 4.168 96.253 14.730
Secured claims / total assets 1.299 0.304 1.423 0.000
Secured claims / total claims 0.191 0.072 0.188 0.000
Ordinary claims / total claims 0.667 0.731 0.689 0.807
Preferred claims / total claims 0.140 0.068 0.115 0.034
Crown claims / total claims 0.110 0.037 0.098 0.016
Crown claims / preferred claims 0.578 0.724 0.543 0.708
Source deductions / crown claims 0.405 0.242 0.405 0.000
Number of secured creditors 1.016 1.000 0.939 0.000
Number of ordinary creditors

38.115 22.000 13.119 9.000
Number of preferred creditors

6.393 3.000 1.573 1.000
Number of contingent creditors 0.041 0.000 0.061 0.000
Number of wage creditors

17.500 4.000 2.933 1.000
Total number of creditors

45.566 26.000 15.692 12.000
Secured creditors / total creditors 0.033 0.018 0.066 0.000
Ordinary creditors / total creditors 0.817 0.867 0.804 0.833
Preferred creditors / total creditors 0.147 0.105 0.126 0.091
Notes:
 : Indicates a statistical dierence between incorporated and unincorporated rms at the 5% level.
1. Of the 417 bankruptcy les in the sample, 122 are incorporated businesses and 295 are unincorporated businesses.
2. The total assets, total liabilities, and the claims variables are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadian dollars,
deated by the gdp deator(series D20556).
3. Of the 41 les with positive wage claims, 26 are incorporated businesses and 15 are unincorporated businesses.
4. Based on 102 les of incorporated businesses and 262 les of unincorporated businesses.
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TABLE 6
Payments to Creditors in Bankruptcy: Incorporated vs. Unincorporated Businesses.
Variables Incorporated Businesses Unincorporated Businesses
Mean Median Mean Median
Payo rate to ordinary creditors
1
2.747 0.000 2.445 0.000
Payo rate to preferred creditors 24.620 0.000 22.473 0.570
TABLE 7
Characteristics of the Bankruptcy Process: Incorporated vs. Unincorporated Businesses.
Variables Incorporated Businesses Unincorporated Businesses
Mean Median Mean Median
Time in bankruptcy (days) 769.550 573.000 837.970 716.000
Total administration costs
;2
12.690 5.943 3.059 1.672
Trustees fees

7.970 3.778 2.287 1.566
Trustees fees / admin.costs

0.647 0.704 0.862 0.935
Admin. costs / assets

0.315 0.209 0.497 0.356
Admin. costs / liabilities

0.068 0.049 0.041 0.039
Notes:
 : Indicates a statistical dierence between incorporated and unincorporated rms at the 5% level.
1. The payo variables are reported in percentages.
2. Administration costs and trustees fees are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadian dollars, deated by the gdp
deator (series D20556).
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TABLE 8
Comparative Statistics on Bankrupt Firms.
Variables Martel Kryzanowski White White
(1994) & Holland (1984) (1984)
(1984) Act Code
Total assets
1
74.231 85.756 736.000 437.000
Total liabilities 232.565 140.185 1 551.000 710.000
Secured claims 72.761 { 548.000 182.000
Ordinary claims 130.117 { 1 047.000 485.000
Preferred claims 26.138 { 65.000 46.000
Liabilities to assets ratio 72.242 { 2.100 1.600
Secured claims / total assets 1.387 { 0.750 0.420
Payo rate to ordinary creditors
2
2.533 1.400 4.000 {
Payo rate to preferred creditors 23.182 24.400 6.000 {
Time in bankruptcy (days) 818.300 870.000 2 190.000 {
Admin. costs / total liabilities 0.049 { 0.010 {
Notes:
1. The claims and administration costs variables are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadian dollars (series D20556)
(deated by the GDP) for Martel, in Canadian nominal dollars for Kryzanowsky & Holland, and in U.S. nominal dollars
for White.
2. The payo rate variables are reported in percentages.
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TABLE 9
Financial Characteristics of Firms in Reorganization in Canada.
1
Variables Mean Median Standard Min Max
deviation
Total assets
2
2 453.309 350.874 19 674.204 0.00 385 765.05
Total liabilities 2 981.584 783.890 15 875.596 22.00 301 750.68
Secured claims 1 610.431 201.254 12 247.279 0.00 237 437.86
Ordinary claims 1 008.831 438.754 2 024.847 11.70 25 659.25
Preferred claims 111.459 23.744 321.962 0.00 4 653.79
Crown claims 76.137 15.094 204.747 0.00 2 424.72
Source Deductions claims
3
39.164 5.919 134.480 0.00 1 952.88
Total wage claims
4
54.527 17.053 111.759 0.53 806.69
Preferred wage claims 38.453 15.270 70.683 0.53 583.87
Ordinary wage claims 16.073 0.000 83.599 0.00 768.94
Total wage claim per worker 1.396 0.750 3.294 0.04 29.21
Contingent claims 250.850 0.000 2 991.901 0.00 56 879.68
Liabilities to assets ratio
5
16.005 1.767 211.130 0.44 4 100.00
Secured claims / total assets
6
0.781 0.539 3.372 0.00 65.00
Secured claims / total claims 0.320 0.308 0.251 0.00 0.96
Ordinary claims / total claims 0.595 0.582 0.264 0.01 1.00
Preferred claims / total claims 0.061 0.035 0.077 0.00 0.52
Crown claims / total claims 0.045 0.021 0.067 0.00 0.50
Crown claims / preferred claims 0.593 0.694 0.384 0.00 1.00
Source deductions / crown claims 0.418 0.324 0.406 0.00 1.00
Number of secured creditors 3.407 2.000 17.071 0.00 331.00
Number of ordinary creditors 86.489 59.000 98.178 2.00 834.00
Number of preferred creditors 20.122 3.000 65.731 0.00 826.00
Number of contingent creditors 0.257 0.000 1.324 0.00 22.00
Number of wage creditors 55.320 23.000 106.910 1.00 820.00
Total number of creditors 110.100 68.000 141.540 4.00 1 257.00
Secured creditors / total creditors 0.045 0.023 0.077 0.00 0.81
Ordinary creditors / total creditors 0.844 0.890 0.146 0.18 1.00
Preferred creditors / total creditors 0.107 0.054 0.135 0.00 0.75
Notes:
1. Except where noted, the information reported in this table is based on a sample of 393 proposals.
2. The total assets, total liabilities, and the claims variables are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadian dollars,
deated by the gdp deator (series D20556).
3. Based on a sample of 377 proposals where the information is available.
4. Based on a sample of 125 proposals with positive wage claims.
5. Based on a sample of 379 proposals where the information is available.
6. Excludes a proposal from an incorporated rm with a ratio of 2953.
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TABLE 10
Distribution of Financial Reorganization Estates by Assets and Liabilities.
Variables Distribution of Estates by
Assets Liabilities
 $100 000 95 31
$100 000 <  $500 000 126 118
$500 000 <  $1 000 000 61 75
$1 000 000 <  $5 000 000 84 125
$5 000 000 <  $10 000 000 15 28
> $10 000 000 12 16
Total 393 393
TABLE 11
Payments Statistics for Reorganization Proposals in Canada.
Variables
1
Mean Median Standard Min Max
deviation
Expected payo in liquidation 37.237 30.332 36.454 0.00 100.00
Reorganization payo
2
38.157 30.000 28.143 0.00 124.00
Proportion of payments in cash
3
7.230 0.000 23.234 0.00 100.00
Proportion of payments by installment 91.141 100.000 25.885 0.00 100.00
Proportion of payments in equity 1.629 0.000 12.378 0.00 100.00
Number of installments 3.050 2.000 4.121 0.00 36.00
Period for repayment (months) 14.011 9.000 16.027 0.00 120.00
% cash payments (< 1 month)
4
9.742 0.000 27.083 0.00 100.00
% payments within 1 month 32.384 0.000 42.627 0.00 100.00
% payments within 3 months 50.224 0.000 42.634 0.00 100.00
% payments within 6 months 62.906 0.000 38.899 0.00 100.00
% payments within 9 months 68.953 0.000 36.413 0.00 100.00
% payments within 12 months 78.364 0.000 31.544 0.00 100.00
% payments within 15 months 81.373 0.000 28.815 0.00 100.00
% payments within 18 months 85.765 0.000 26.735 0.00 100.00
% payments within 21 months 87.613 0.000 25.372 0.00 100.00
% payments within 24 months 90.823 0.000 23.228 0.00 100.00
Notes:
1. The liquidation and reorganization payo variables are reported in percentages. The proportion of payments variables
are reported in percentage of the reorganization payo.
2. Based on a sample of 356 proposals where the payo to ordinary creditors is given.
3. Based on a sample of 342 proposals where the information is available.
4. Based on a sample of 305 proposals where the information is available.
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TABLE 12
Characteristics of the Reorganization Process in Canada.
Variables Mean Median Standard Min Max
deviation
Acceptance rate of reorganization proposals 0.748 - - - -
Success rate of accepted proposals 0.704 - - - -
Proportion of holding proposals 0.232 - - - -
Time between ling and voting (days)
1
50.000 25.000 105.460 0.00 1 631.00
Time in reorganization (days)
2
1 136.000 965.000 756.600 70.00 5 057.00
Number of amendments to the proposal
3
0.408 0.000 0.570 0.00 2.00
Number of unsecured creditors at the assembly 30.870 19.00 36.779 1.00 269.00
% unsecured creditors voting on a plan
4
34.535 32.653 17.005 4.08 100.00
% unsecured creditors approving a plan
5
84.446 90.900 20.222 0.00 100.00
% of claims of unsecured creditors 80.617 95.000 29.756 0.00 100.00
approving a plan
Total administration costs
6;7
46.312 20.046 92.226 1.75 897.04
Trustees' fees
8
27.800 13.560 46.284 0.57 399.39
Ratio of trustees' fees to admin. costs 0.694 0.729 0.171 0.04 0.98
Admin. costs / payments to creditors
9
0.131 0.055 0.249 0.00 3.28
Admin. costs / total liabilities
10
0.048 0.029 0.053 0.00 0.34
Notes:
1. Based on a sample of 388 proposals where the information is available.
2. Based on a sample of 354 proposals where the information is available.
3. Based on a sample of 390 proposals where the information is available.
4. Based on a sample of 330 proposals where the information is available.
5. The proportions of unsecured creditors voting on the plan, of unsecured creditors approving a plan and of claims of
unsecured creditors approving a plan are given in percentages.
6. Based on a sample of 344 proposals where the information is available.
7. Administration costs and trustees' fees are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadian dollars, deated by the gdp
deator (series D20556).
8. Based on a sample of 340 proposals where the information is available.
9. Total payment to creditors = secured claims + preferred claims + (ordinary claims * payo on ordinary claims). Based
on a sample of 314 proposals where the information is available.
10. Based on a sample of 344 proposals where the information is available.
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TABLE 13
Financial Characteristics of Incorporated and Unincorporated Businesses in Reorganization.
1
Variables Incorporated Businesses Unincorporated Businesses
Mean Median Mean Median
Total assets
;2
2 840.379 482.446 171.410 64.308
Total liabilities

3 365.174 949.217 719.734 193.349
Secured claims

1 865.743 241.913 105.384 36.240
Ordinary claims

1 115.667 503.813 379.078 128.651
Preferred claims

129.036 34.743 7.832 0.160
Crown claims

88.012 20.023 6.142 0.000
Source Deductions claims

45.335 8.631 4.186 0.000
Total wage claims
3
56.166 17.999 4.931 1.861
Preferred wage claims 39.561 16.009 4.931 1.861
Ordinary wage claims 16.605 0.000 0.000 0.000
Total wage claim per worker 1.420 0.750 0.692 0.536
Contingent claims 254.815 0.000 227.432 0.000
Liabilities to assets ratio 16.010 1.753 15.969 2.068
Secured claims / total assets
4
0.647 0.548 1.568 0.417
Secured claims / liabilities

0.333 0.328 0.244 0.130
Ordinary claims / liabilities

0.580 0.565 0.684 0.739
Preferred claims / liabilities

0.065 0.037 0.037 0.001
Crown claims / liabilities

0.047 0.024 0.029 0.000
Crown claims / preferred claims

0.631 0.745 0.364 0.000
Source deductions / crown claims

0.438 0.376 0.305 0.000
Number of secured creditors

3.729 2.000 1.509 1.000
Number of ordinary creditors

97.631 67.000 20.807 15.000
Number of preferred creditors

23.247 3.000 1.702 1.000
Number of contingent creditors 0.268 0.000 0.193 0.000
Number of wage creditors 56.860 24.000 8.750 2.000
Total number of creditors

124.880 81.000 24.211 18.000
Secured creditors / total creditors 0.037 0.021 0.087 0.039
Ordinary creditors / total creditors 0.845 0.894 0.837 0.857
Preferred creditors / total creditors 0.115 0.058 0.062 0.029
Notes:
 : Indicates a statistical dierence between incorporated and unincorporated rms at the 5% level.
1. Of the 393 proposals in the sample, 336 were led by incorporated businesses and 57 were led by unincorporated
businesses.
2. The total assets, total liabilities, and the claims variables are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadian dollars,
deated by the gdp deator (series D20556).
3. Of the 125 les with positive wage claims, 121 are incorporated businesses and 4 are unincorporated businesses.
4. Excludes a proposal form an incorporated rm with a ratio of 2953.
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TABLE 14
Payments to Creditors in Reorganization: Incorporated vs. Unincorporated Businesses.
Variables Incorporated Businesses Unincorporated Businesses
Mean Median Mean Median
Expected payo in liquidation 38.237 31.418 31.339 21.199
Reorganization payo 38.784 30.000 34.801 25.000
Proportion of payments in cash 6.296 0.000 12.214 0.000
Proportion of payments by installment 91.770 100.000 87.786 100.000
Proportion of payments in equity 1.934 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of installments 2.925 2.000 3.646 1.000
Period for repayment (months) 13.953 9.000 14.333 6.000
% cash payments (< 1 month) 8.893 0.000 14.651 0.000
% payments within 1 month 31.418 0.000 37.965 12.000
% payments within 3 months 49.734 4.000 53.054 0.476
% payments within 6 months 61.794 6.400 69.330 100.000
% payments within 9 months 67.902 100.000 75.025 100.000
% payments within 12 months 77.798 100.000 81.639 100.000
% payments within 15 months 81.151 100.000 82.657 100.000
% payments within 18 months 85.950 100.000 84.697 100.000
% payments within 21 months 88.018 100.000 85.271 100.000
% payments within 24 months 91.276 100.000 88.206 100.000
TABLE 15
Characteristics of the Reorganization Process: Incorporated vs. Unincorporated Businesses.
Variables Incorporated Businesses Unincorporated Businesses
Mean Median Mean Median
Acceptance rate of proposals

0.726 - 0.877 -
Success rate of accepted proposals 0.693 - 0.760 -
Proportion of holding proposals

0.268 - 0.035 -
Time between ling and voting (days) 50.009 24.000 49.855 26.000
Time in reorganization (days) 1 144.500 1 106.000 1 092.500 837.000
Number of amendments to the proposal 0.417 0.000 0.351 0.000
Total administration costs
;1
52.558 23.349 14.863 6.894
Trustees' fees

31.087 16.184 10.761 4.902
Trustees' fees / admin.costs

0.686 0.717 0.733 0.762
Admin. costs / payments to creditors

0.118 0.047 0.193 0.122
Admin. costs / total liabilities 0.043 0.026 0.071 0.044
Notes:
 : Indicates a statistical dierence between incorporated and unincorporated rms at the 5% level.
1. The liquidation payo, reorganization payo, and the payments variables are reported in percentages.
2. Administration costs and trustees' fees are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadian dollars, deated by the gdp
deator (series D20556).
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TABLE 16
Comparative Statistics on Firms in Reorganization.
Variables Martel Fisher Kryzanowsky White White
1
(1994) & Martel & Holland (1984) (1984)
(1994) (1984) Act Code
Total assets
2
2 453.309 2 372.100 247.592 1 592.000 1 643.000
Total liabilities 2 981.584 3 971.700 { 1 835 000 2 226.000
Secured claims 1 610.431 1 890.500 { 480.000 1 072.000
Ordinary claims 1 008.831 1 324.700 { 1 309.000 1 100.000
Preferred claims 111.459 96.100 { 40.000 68.000
Crown claims 76.137 79.600 { { {
Liabilities to assets ratio 19.894 18.600 { 1.150 1.350
Secured claims / total assets 0.781 1.100 { 0.300 0.650
Secured claims / total liabilities 0.320 0.360 { { {
Ordinary claims / total liabilities 0.595 0.550 { { {
Preferred claims / total liabilities 0.061 0.056 { { {
Crown claims/ total liabilities 0.045 0.045 { { {
Crown claims/ preferred claims 0.593 0.641 { { {
Number of secured creditors 3.407 2.604 { { {
Number of ordinary creditors 86.489 80.435 { { {
Number of preferred creditors 20.122 13.607 { { {
Total number of creditors 110.100 97.784 { { {
Secured creditors / total creditors 0.045 0.075 { { {
Ordinary creditors / total creditors 0.844 0.810 { { {
Preferred creditors / total creditors 0.107 0.093 { { {
Payo rate to ordinary creditors
3
38.157 43.645 36.900 33.000 34.000
Proportion of payments in cash 7.230 14.427 { 27.273 47.058
Proportion of payments by installment 91.141 80.763 { 72.727 52.942
Proportion of payments by equity 1.629 3.376 { { {
Number of installments 3.050 { 7.000 { {
Period for repayment (months) 14.011 22.052 24.000 { {
Expected payo in bankruptcy 37.237 28.700 { { {
Acceptance rate of proposals 0.748 0.770 { { {
Success rate of accepted proposals 0.704 0.813 0.530 { {
Time between ling and voting (days) 50.000 52.518 { 720.000 204.000
Time in reorganization (days) 1 136.000 1 030.300 { { {
Admin. costs / total liabilities 0.048 0.043 { 0.005 {
Admin. costs / payments to creditors 0.131 0.132 { 0.030 0.034
Notes:
1. Information on the payments to creditors, the ratio of administration costs to payments to creditors and the time between
ling and voting originates from a sub sample of 26 conrmed reorganization plans.
2. The claims and administration costs variables are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadian dollars deated by the
GDP) for Martel, in December 1993 Canadian dollars (deated by the GDP) for Fisher & Martel, in Canadian nominal
dollars for Kryzanowsky & Holland, and in U.S. nominal dollars for White.
3. The payo rate and payment variables are reported in percentages.
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